Introduction
What sorts of visual representations are generated as we view a scene over an extended period of time? How is the information that is acquired during one fixation integrated with information acquired during subsequent fixations to create an overall scene representation? What is the role of short-and long-term memory in scene perception? The main objective of this chapter is to develop an understanding of the nature of the scene representation that is generated during extended, dynamic scene viewing. In our view, six important phenomena present an interesting puzzle for theories of scene perception, visual memory, and scene representation.
(1) Saccadic eye movements are an important component of scene perception.
Because of the optical structure of the eyes, the gradient of cone density in the retina, and the preferential mapping of foveal photoreceptors onto visual cortical tissue, acuity and color sensitivity is highest at the point of fixation and drops off precipitously and continuously with increasing visual eccentricity (Anstis, 1974; Mullen, 1990; Riggs, 1965) . The highest quality visual information is acquired from the region of the scene that projects to the fovea, a region of the retinal corresponding to about the central 2 degrees of the viewed scene. The fact that high-acuity vision is restricted to a relatively small central region of the entire visual field places an important constraint on human perception. The visual system overcomes this constraint by rapidly and efficiently maneuvering the fixation point around a visual scene by way of very rapid (saccadic) eye movements (Buswell, 1935; Henderson & Hollingworth, 1998 , 1999b Rayner, 1998; Yarbus, 1967 ). An example fixation sequence (scan pattern) is shown in the top panel of Figure 1 . During a saccade, the point of regard sweeps rapidly across the scene (shown by the lines in Figure 1 ). During a fixation, the point of regard is relatively (though not perfectly) still (shown by the dots) for about 330 ms on average. Pattern information is acquired during the fixations; information useful for perceptual analysis of the scene typically cannot be acquired during a saccade due to saccadic suppression (Matin, 1974; Volkmann, 1986) .
(2) We have the undeniable perceptual experience of a complete and detailed visual world.
Interestingly, despite the fact that the eyes saccade about three times each second and vision is suppressed during saccades, we do not experience the tens of milliseconds that transpire during these movements as blank periods or "holes" in our visual experience, nor do we experience the world as a series of discrete snapshots from each fixation. Instead, when we glance about our visual environment, we have the perceptual experience of a complete, full color, highly detailed, and stable visual world. That is, our perceptual experience suggests to us that the visual system in some sense creates a high-resolution internal copy of the external world, similar to the way a camera creates a detailed color photograph. Indeed, this experience traditionally forms the basis for much of the theoretical work in both human and computer vision, and it has been a major consideration in recent theoretical treatments of scene representation and visual memory (e.g., O'Regan, 1992; Rensink, 2000a; Wolfe, 1999) .
(3) Precise, pre-categorical, metrical sensory information is not carried across saccades.
Given the strong constraints on visual acuity and color sensitivity across the retina, the generation of the sort of complete internal visual representation that might underlie perceptual experience would seem to require the storage of a high-resolution sensory image across each saccade, with images from consecutive fixations overlapped or spatially aligned to form the composite image. Indeed, there is a long and venerable history of this sort of proposal in vision science (for reviews see Bridgeman, Van der Hejiden, & Velichkovsky, 1994, and Currie, 1996) . We will refer to this general proposal as the composite sensory image hypothesis. Traditionally, the composite image hypothesis has been instantiated by models in which a sensory image is generated during each fixation and stored in a temporary buffer, with images from consecutive fixations spatially aligned and fused in a system that maps a retinal reference frame onto a spatiotopic frame (Breitmeyer, Kropfl, & Julesz, 1982; Davidson, Fox, & Dick, 1973; Duhamel, Colby, & Goldberg, 1992; Feldman, 1985; Jonides, Irwin, & Yantis, 1982; McConkie & Rayner, 1976; O'Regan & Lévy-Schoen, 1983; Pouget, Fisher, & Sejnowski, 1993; Trehub, 1977) . In such models, the composite image formed during consecutive fixations could be aligned by tracking the extent of the saccade (via afferent or efferent pathways) or by comparing the similarity of the individual images themselves.
Although many different instantiations of the composite image hypothesis have been proposed, psychophysical and behavioral data from the vision and cognition literatures have overwhelmingly provided evidence against them. This work has been extensively reviewed elsewhere (see, e.g., Irwin, 1992a , Irwin & Andrews, 1996 Pollatsek & Rayner, 1992) , so we will not devote too much time to it here. However, it is worthwhile gaining an appreciation of the nature of the evidence bearing on this issue.
There are two general sources of evidence against the creation of a composite image via spatiotopic sensory fusion across saccades. First, and perhaps most convincing, is the evidence directly showing that viewers can't fuse simple visual patterns across saccades. In these paradigms, viewers are required to integrate a pre-saccade and post-saccade pattern in order to successfully accomplish the task. The logic of these experiments is that if visual patterns can be fused in a spatiotopically based sensory memory system, then performance should be similar in a transsaccadic condition where environmental spatial position of the patterns is maintained but retinal position is displaced due to a saccade, and a condition where position in both retinal and absolute environmental frames is maintained within a fixation.
For example, when two dot patterns forming a matrix of dots are presented in rapid succession at the same retinal and spatial position within an eye fixation, a single fused pattern is perceived and performance (e.g., identification of a missing dot from the matrix) can be based upon this percept (Di Lollo, 1980; Eriksen & Collins, 1967; Irwin, 1991) . However, when the two patterns are viewed with similar timing parameters at the same external spatial position but different retinal positions across a saccade, no such fused percept is experienced and performance is dramatically reduced (Bridgeman & Mayer, 1983; Irwin, 1991; Irwin, Brown, & Sun, 1988; Irwin, Zacks, & Brown, 1990; O'Regan & LevyShoen, 1983; Rayner & Pollatsek, 1983) . In the latter case, overall performance is limited to and constrained by the capacity of short-term memory (Irwin et al., 1988) . Other effects that might be expected based on the formation of a composite image via sensory fusion, such as spatiotopically based visual masking, and changes to spatial frequency thresholds, are also not observed (Irwin et al., 1988; Irwin et al., 1990) .
(4) Across saccades and other visual disruptions such as blanks, blinks, and interpositions, changes to scenes are often very difficult to consciously detect, a phenomenon known as change blindness.
A second source of evidence against the creation of a composite image across saccades via sensory fusion comes from the apparent insensitivity of viewers to visual changes in an image across a saccade or other visual disruption, a phenomenon that has recently come to be called "change blindness" (Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 1997; Simons, 2000; . Though coming into more prominence recently, this phenomenon has been known in the visual stability and transsaccadic integration literatures at least since the mid 1970's, when advances in eyetracking and visual display technology first provided the opportunity for investigators to change a display contingent on the detection of the onset of a saccade. Some of the earliest reports of this phenomenon involved scene changes (Bridgeman, Hendry, & Stark, 1975) and text changes in reading (Rayner, 1975 (Rayner, , 1978 .
One example of change blindness involves spatially displacing an image across a saccade. Such displacements should be quite detectable if pre-and post-saccade sensory images are aligned and integrated via subtraction of the spatial extent of the saccade. In an early study, Bridgeman et al. (1975) demonstrated that a scene can be spatially displaced during a saccade with no conscious experience that the stimulus has shifted position, and with little or no disruption to the performance of a visual task. This insensitivity to spatial displacement across saccades has subsequently been replicated many times (e.g., Currie, McConkie, Carlson-Radvansky, & Irwin, 2000; Bridgeman & Stark, 1979; Henderson, 1997; Irwin, 1991; Mack, 1970; McConkie & Currie, 1996; McConkie, Zola, & Wolverton, 1980; O'Regan, 1981; Verfaillie, De Troy, & Van Rensbergen, 1994; Whipple & Wallach, 1978) .
Changes to other visual properties are similarly difficult to detect across a saccade. For example, McConkie and Zola (1979) demonstrated that readers are quite insensitive to changes in the visual properties of text from fixation to fixation. In these experiments, readers read text made up of characters of alternating case (e.g., ThIs iS iN aLtErNaTiNg CaSe). During a given saccade, the case of all characters was swapped (e.g., tHiS Is In AlTeRnAtInG cAsE). These case changes were not noticed by readers and had very little if any effect on reading rate or comprehension (see also Rayner, McConkie, & Zola, 1980, for similar results) .
Similar insensitivity to changes in visual features of an image across a saccade has been shown with pictures of objects and scenes. For example, Henderson (1997) showed that it is very difficult to detect a change to the specific contours of an object from fixation to fixation. Participants were asked to fixate a point on a computer screen. A line drawing of an object was then presented to the right of fixation. About half of the contours of the object was presented; the other contours were occluded by black stripes (as an object might appear when viewed through a picket fence). The participant executed a saccade to the object as soon as it appeared. During the saccade, the object either remained exactly the same, changed to reveal the complementary set of contours, shifted ½ cycle in position, or changed to a different object. The participant was asked to indicate if any change occurred. Participants failed to detect the majority of contour changes or position shifts. In a control condition in which the changes took place at the same retinal and spatial position (and at the same visual eccentricity as the preview had appeared) within a fixation, change detection was quite good. This latter result ensures that the contours and positions could be discriminated at the peripheral position.
Insensitivity to visual changes that take place across a saccade has also been demonstrated during natural scene viewing where available semantic constraints might be expected to support encoding of visual information. For example, in a striking demonstration of the insensitivity of a viewer to changes, Grimes (McConkie, 1990, 1991 ; first published as Grimes, 1996) reported a study in which viewers studied full-color pictures of scenes over extended viewing times. The participants were instructed to view the scenes in preparation for a relatively difficult memory test. They were further told that something in a scene would occasionally change and that they should press a button if and when that happened. Participants' eye movements were monitored during viewing with a fast and accurate eyetracker, and one region of a scene was changed during the nth saccade, where n was predetermined prior to the experiment. The striking result was that viewers often failed to detect what would seem to be very obvious perceptual (and conceptual) changes in the scene. For example, none of the participants detected a 25% increase in the size of a prominent building in a city skyline, and none detected that the hats on two central men switched heads (Grimes, 1996) . If visual information were accumulating across saccades in a spatiotopically organized representational system, then these sorts of visual changes should be easily detectable. Thus, these results have been taken to call into question the idea that any kind of detailed visual scene representation is retained and integrated across saccades (e.g., O'Regan, 1992; Rensink, 2000a Rensink, , 2000b Wolfe, 1999) .
Other visual stimulus changes such as enlargements and reductions of object size often go unnoticed when they take place during a saccade (Henderson, 1997; Henderson, Pollatsek, & Rayner, 1987; Pollatsek, Rayner, & Collins, 1984) . Visual changes to complete scenes and scene elements across a saccade can be imperceptible, including changes to spatial orientation, color, and even object presence (Grimes, 1996; Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999a; McConkie, 1991; McConkie & Currie, 1996) . This same sort of change blindness can be observed in other paradigms, such as when a blank field is inserted between two scene images to simulate a saccade (Rensink et al., 1997) . Similar insensitivity to change is observed when multiple gray patches (similar to mud splattering on a windshield) are presented on a scene simultaneously with the scene change (O'Regan, , during blinks (O'Regan, Deubel, Clark, & Rensink, 2000) , across film splices , and even in the real world when an object is interposed between the observer and a changing object during the change (Simons & Levin, 1998; see Simons & Levin, 1997 , Simons, 2000 . Overall, when local motion signals are removed from the visual signal, or when multiple motion signals are presented, detection of what would otherwise be a highly visible change becomes extraordinarily difficult.
Importantly, change blindness appears to be mediated by attention: Once a change has been detected, it is then very easy to see. In the transsaccadic change detection paradigm, changes are much more easily detected when they occur during a saccade toward the changing object (Currie et al., 2000; Hayhoe, Bensinger, & Ballard, 1998; Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999a) than during a saccade away from that object (Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999a) . Similarly, transsaccadic integration is heavily weighted toward the saccade target (Henderson, 1994; Henderson & Anes, 1994; Irwin & Andrews, 1996) , at least partly due to the fact that attention is mandatorily allocated to the saccade target prior to a saccade (Deubel & Schneider, 1996; Henderson, 1993 Henderson, , 1996 Henderson, Pollatsek, & Rayner, 1989; Hoffman & Subramanian, 1995; Irwin & Gordon, 1998; Kowler, Anderson, Dosher, & Blaser, 1995; Rayner, McConkie, & Ehrlich, 1978; Shepherd, Findlay, & Hockey, 1986) . In the change blindness literature, changes are better detected in the flicker paradigm at scene regions rated to be of higher interest (Rensink et al., 1997) , at semantically unexpected objects (Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000a) , at locations to which attention has been explicitly directed (Scholl, 2000) , and at locations near fixation (Hollingworth, Schrock, & Henderson, in press ). Intuitively, once a change has been detected, attention dwells on that region, making the change thereafter quite obvious to the viewer. Irwin and colleagues have demonstrated in a transsaccadic partial report task that the perceptual properties of up to four visual patterns can be retained across saccades in VSTM (Irwin & Andrews, 1996) . Carlson-Radvansky (CarlsonRadvansky & Irwin, 1995; Carlson-Radvansky, 1999) has similarly shown that structural descriptions of simple visual patterns can be retained across saccades. In transsaccadic object identification studies, participants are faster to identify an object when a preview of that object has been available prior to the saccade than when no preview is available (e.g., Henderson, 1994 Henderson, , 1997 Henderson & Siefert, 1999, in press; Henderson et al., 1987 Henderson et al., , 1989 Pollatsek et al., 1984; Pollatsek, Rayner, & Henderson, 1990) . Furthermore, this preview benefit can be affected by visual changes such as replacement of one visual token with another token of the same conceptual type (Henderson & Siefert, in press) and mirror reflections (Henderson & Siefert, 1999, in press ). The influence of visual change on preview benefit is more pronounced when the spatial location of the target object remains constant compared with when the location changes (Henderson, 1994; Henderson & Anes, 1994) . These results strongly suggest that some visual properties are preserved in the representation that is retained across saccades, and furthermore that such representations are tied to spatial position.
(6) Scene memory is exceptionally good for large numbers of scenes over extended time periods.
Despite the fact that viewers are very insensitive to changes in scenes, other research has shown very good long-term memory for scenes. For example, Nickerson (1965) had participants view 200 black and white photographs for 5 sec each; on an oldnew recognition test, participants correctly recognized 92% of pictures (controlling for false alarm rate). Shepard (1967) similarly demonstrated 97% correct recognition for 612 color pictures when tested immediately and 99.7% when tested two hours later. Standing, Conezio, and Haber (1970) showed participants 2,560 pictures for 10 sec each over several days. Memory for the entire set was well over 90%, and memory for a subset of 280 thematically similar scenes was 90%. Standing et al. (1970) also manipulated the left-right orientation of the scene at study and test, and showed that participants could recognize the studied picture orientation 86% of the time after a 30 sec retention interval and 72% of the time after 24 hours. Good memory for scenes has also been shown in paradigms investigating eye movements and scene encoding (Friedman, 1979; Parker, 1978) .
Other sources of evidence converge on the conclusion that a relatively detailed visual representation must be generated and stored at some level by the visual system. These include phenomena such as perceptual learning and perceptual priming. We do not have space to review these literatures here, but we do want to note that it would be difficult to account for such important perceptual and cognitive phenomena without positing that relatively detailed visual representations of some sort can be generated and stored in long-term memory.
Summary
The disparate findings in the scene perception, change blindness, transsaccadic integration, and scene memory literatures present an interesting contradiction for theories of scene representation. On the one hand, the results from these literatures suggest that visual scene representations are impoverished at best, and non-existent at worst. On the other hand, the results from the transsaccadic preview benefit and scene memory literatures, as well as visual phenomenology, suggest that a more complete and detailed visual representation of a viewed scene is created. How can these contradictory conclusions be reconciled?
Theoretical Accounts of Scene Representation and Visual Memory Localist-Minimalist Approaches
Placing primary emphasis on the change blindness phenomenon, several recent theories have rejected the notion that a global detailed scene representation is ever generated. In these localistminimalist theories, scene memory phenomena are downplayed as the result of retention of scene gist, and the perceptual experience of a complete visual world is taken to be an illusion. For example, O'Regan (1992) proposed that because the "world is its own memory", the visual system does not need to store visual information from fixation to fixation. On this view, visual stability and coherence are illusions brought about by the fact that visual information can be sampled from the world when needed via shifts of attention and fixation (O'Regan, 1992; O'Reagan et al., 1999; Rensink et al., 1997) . Indeed, based on demonstrations that visual search does not become more efficient with high levels of practice, Wolfe (1999) has argued that there are no perceptual consequences from having attended and perceived specific objects in the environment. According to Wolfe, "…when attention is deployed away from some previously attended object or locus, no trace of the effects of attention remain in the visual representation." (Wolfe, 1999, p. 75) . Thus, once the eyes have moved on, there should be no coherent visual representation to integrate across fixations. Examples of this general approach include the proposals of O'Regan (1992), Simons and Levin (1997) , Wolfe (1999) , Irwin (1992a; Irwin & Andrews, 1996 ), and Rensink (2000a . Perhaps the most complete and explicit localist-minimalist theories are the Object File Theory of Transsaccadic Integration (Irwin, 1992a (Irwin, , 1992b Irwin & Andrews, 1996) which builds on the original Object File Theory (Kahneman & Triesman, 1984; Kahneman, Triesman, & Gibbs, 1992) , and Coherence Theory (Rensink, 2000a (Rensink, , 2000b . As a class, localist-minimalist theories assume that scene representation consists of a sensory coding of the current retinal image (typically with acknowledgment of image degradation as a function of retinal position), a coherent visual representation of the scene region or object currently under attention (and perhaps a few other objects actively attended in visual short-term memory), and a sketchy semantic representation of the gist of the scene along with the identities of previously attended objects. We term these theoretical positions "localist-minimalist" because of their commitment to the assumption that at any given moment coherent visual representations are generated only for a limited scene region, typically the region currently attended or at most the last three or four attended regions (localism), and to the assumption that visual representations are retained for no more than a few seconds and so are not available to be integrated into a composite scene representation (minimalism). Though the details differ in a number of ways, we can also find a commitment to representational localism and minimalism in recent theorizing in computer vision (e.g., Ballard, 1991 Ballard, , 1996 Ballard, Hayhoe, Pook, & Rao, 1997; Brooks 1991) and in philosophy (e.g., Dennett, 1991; Churchland, Ramachandran, & Sejnowski, 1994) .
A Visual Memory Theory of Scene Representation
Based on data we have recently collected that is incompatible with the localist-minimalist view (see below), we have proposed an alternative theory of scene representation that rejects the notions of localism and minimalism. The theory instead posits that a relatively detailed scene representation is built up in memory over time and across successive fixations (Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000b) . The theory states that visual detail is retained both over the short-term in a visual short-term memory buffer similar to that envisioned in Irwin's (1992a; Irwin & Andrews, 1996) Object File Theory (though the specifics of exactly what is retained in our views differ somewhat), and over the longer term, in longterm scene memory of the sort described in the extended scene memory literature (Standing et al., 1970; see also Friedman, 1979) . At the same time, the theory acknowledges that these visual representations are not sensory in nature Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000b) .
In Visual Memory Theory, the allocation of attention to a scene region gates sensory processing of that region, which (a) leads to the generation of visual token representations that are abstracted away from the sensory properties in the image, but that code the visual properties of that object or region, including object shape and position, and (b) leads to the activation of semantic representations and identities of attended objects (Henderson, 1994; Henderson & Anes, 1994; Henderson & Siefert, 1999, in press ). Object shape is abstractly coded in a representational system such as a view-based structural description (Carlson-Radvansky & Irwin, 1995; Carlson-Radvansky, 1999 ; see also Bulthoff, Edelman, & Tarr, 1995) , and position is abstractly coded in multiple spatial reference frames including an allocentric (i.e., scene-based) reference frame (Henderson, 1994; Henderson & Anes, 1994) . Similarly, other visual properties such as color can be coded, albeit in an abstract rather than sensory form (see below). It is proposed that these abstracted representations can be actively maintained in a short-term memory store that has many of the properties typically associated with classic conceptions of short-term memory, including limited capacity and abstract format (Irwin & Andrews, 1996) . We further postulate that short-term scene memory has a property of the conceptual short-term memory system proposed by Potter and colleagues (Potter, 1999) : Processing in STM leads both to consolidation of the information as part of the overall scene representation and to transfer of the information into a more stable longterm memory representation. However, in our view, both visual and semantic representations can be consolidated and transferred to LTM.
In addition to encoding information at fixation, transsaccadic memory is particularly likely to contain information about the saccade target (Currie et al., 2000; Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999a; Irwin & Andrews, 1996) because attention is obligatorily allocated to the target of an impending saccade (e.g., Hoffman & Subramanian, 1995; Kowler et al., 1995; Sheperd et al., 1986) . Once the eyes begin to move (or the scene is otherwise removed from view), sensory representations established during the prior fixation quickly decay (Sperling, 1960) , leaving only the abstracted representations that are currently held in STM, along with the information that has been transferred to long-term memory. When the eyes land and a new fixation begins, the visual information stored in STM will be compared to information encoded in the current fixation. If the information is similar enough, it will be integrated; otherwise an error signal will be generated and the change will be detected. Because information from the saccade target prior to a saccade and from the fixation point following the saccade are the regions of the scene most likely to be attended before and after the saccade, changes to these regions are most likely to be noticed (Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999a; Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000b) , and similarities in these regions are most likely to be integrated in a transsaccadic integration paradigm (Henderson, 1994; Henderson et al., 1989) .
Importantly, in Visual Memory Theory, when the information needed to detect a change (or to support an integrated scene representation) is not currently held in STM, that information can be retrieved from long-term memory if it was successfully transferred and stored during a previous fixation (Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000b; Hollingworth, Williams, & Henderson, 2000) . Attention to the relevant scene region greatly increases the probability that the information will be retrieved from LTM because local information in the scene provides a strong retrieval cue for longterm memory. Furthermore, because of the tight link between attention and fixation, returning the eyes to a scene region increases the chances of detecting a change to that region. Even if the object has been deleted from the region, the spatial position of fixation and the coding of nearby scene information provide a strong retrieval cue for that object (Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999a) . This basic assumption accounts for the strong tendency for late detections in the change detection paradigm to take place only when the changed object is refixated (Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999a; Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000b; .
In the context of Visual Memory Theory, it is important to draw a distinction between sensory representations and abstract visual representations. Specifically, representation of detailed visual information does not imply the preservation of a sensory image. In our view, the representations that are retained and integrated across saccades are visually specific, but abstract. We take sensory representation to refer to a complete, precise, precategorical, maskable, and metrically organized "iconic" image of the visual scene (Irwin 1992b; Neisser, 1967; Sperling, 1960) . In contrast, an abstract visual representation is an imprecise, postcategorical, non-maskable, and non-iconic visual description encoded in the vocabulary of visual computation. This same point has been made by Irwin and colleagues in their study of transsaccadic integration, and the distinction maps well onto the distinction in the "iconic memory" literature between visual and informational persistence on the one hand, and visual short-term memory on the other (Irwin, 1992b; see also Coltheart, 1980) . Importantly, abstract visual representations can still be considered visual in that they represent visual properties such as object shape, albeit in a nonsensory format. A good candidate for the abstract representation of shape is a structural description; recent evidence suggests that shape may be encoded and retained across saccades via structural description (Carlson-Radvansky & Irwin, 1995; Carlson-Radvansky, 1999) . Note that abstract visual representations are not to be taken as equivalent to conceptual representations, which code semantic properties of the viewed scene, nor are they meant to be linguistic descriptions of scene properties. Examples of abstracted visual representations are structural descriptions (e.g., Biederman, 1987; Marr, 1982; Palmer, 1977) and hierarchical feature representations (e.g., Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999) , which are neither conceptual nor linguistic.
In summary, in Visual Memory Theory, transsaccadic change detection is a function of: (a) initial attention to and encoding of information from a scene region as an abstract visual representation, (b) retention of that representation either in an active state in short-term memory and/or in an inactive state in long-term memory, (c) generation of a new representation to compare to the stored representation, and (d) retrieval of the stored representation back from LTM into STM if it is not already currently active. A strength of the theory is that it draws upon independently motivated principles that have been established in the memory literature; Visual Memory Theory places a great deal of the explanatory machinery for change detection and for transsaccadic integration firmly on the shoulders of visual memory, both short-and long-term. Although the theory assumes that nowhere in the system are precise sensory images retained across saccades, it nevertheless posits that a relatively detailed scene representation can be generated and stored over time. This scene representation comes about via the storage of abstract visual representations of local objects and scene elements in long-term memory (what we have called long-term object files; Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000b) , tied together with a spatial representation of object locations. Cognitive representations including object and scene identity and meaning are also generated during fixations, and these can also be stored both in short-term and long-term memory along with more specific visual representations coded by the long-term object files.
It is important that we be clear about the domain and scope of the Visual Memory Theory. The theory is meant to capture the nature of the scene representations that are generated, retained, and available for comparison and integration across extended viewing time and multiple eye fixations. Thus, the nature of the representations that support conscious experience of change, or indeed the conscious experience of anything, is beyond the scope of the theory. The theory is agnostic about whether conscious perceptual experience derives from the initial sensory representations (i.e., iconic, precategorical representations), the more abstract perceptual representations that result from sensory processing and that we are focusing on, or something else.
Specification of the degree to which a theory of scene representation is meant to apply to conscious experience is important, because there has been some confusion in the literature about what exactly theories of "change blindness" or, less assumption-bound, change detection failure, are trying to account for. For example, the Coherence Theory proposed by Rensink (2000) appears to be an account of the nature of conscious experience, and the role of attention in generating that experience. Similarly, Wolfe (1999; Wolfe, Klempen, & Dahlen, 2000) has proposed a theory of the relationship between attentional deployment and perceptual processing that appears to be an attempt to explain conscious perception rather than visual representation, though the theory does clearly include assumptions that speak to the latter issue. Such an emphasis on phenomenology is consistent with historical approaches to perception, in which the purpose of perceptual theory is to explain perceptual experience. For example, as Milner and Goodale put it, "From this perspective, the task of visual science boils down to the problem of understanding how the spatiotopic mosaic of light striking the retina is parsed into the array of discrete objects and events that comprise one's perceptual experience." (1995, p. 5) . Visual Memory Theory is aimed at explaining the nature of the representation generated for a scene, whether that representation is available to conscious experience or not.
Recent Evidence Bearing on Visual Memory and Scene Representation
In a series of studies, we have sought to determine whether the visual representation of natural scenes is better accounted for by localist-minimalist theories or by Visual Memory Theory. We have used two general methods to explore this question. First, we tested participants' ability to detect changes to objects that had been attended within a scene but were not within the current focus of attention when the change occurred (Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999a; Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000b; . Second, we tested participants' memory for the visual form of a previously attended object by asking them to discriminate the original target from a similar distractor (Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000b) . Localist-minimalist theories hold that coherent object representations disintegrate when attention is withdrawn from an object and thus predict that change detection and forced-choice discrimination for previously (but not currently) attended objects should be at floor or at chance. Consistent with the Visual Memory Theory, however, both change detection and forced-choice discrimination performance has revealed that quite detailed visual object representations are retained in memory from previously attended objects. Participants detect visual changes to previously attended objects on a significant percentage of trials and demonstrate accurate forced-choice discrimination performance on object memory tests.
Change Detection Experiments
One set of experiments employed a change detection paradigm in which a target object in a natural scene was changed during a saccadic eye movement within the scene (Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999a Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000b; . Participants were asked to view pictures of common environments to prepare for a difficult memory test, and in addition were asked to monitor the scenes for changes. In a critical set of conditions, a target object was changed during a saccade away from that object after it had been fixated the first time (away condition) or during a saccade to a different object in the scene (other object condition). This paradigm is illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure  1 . In each of these cases, the target object was attended at some point prior to the change but was no longer within the current focus of attention when the change occurred. The assumption that visual attention had been withdrawn from the target object prior to the change depends on evidence from numerous studies demonstrating that visual attention is mandatorily allocated to the target of the next saccadic eye movement prior to the execution of that eye movement. For example, Hoffman & Subramanian (1995) provided evidence that visual attention is allocated exclusively to the saccade target prior to the execution of a saccade, as participants could not attend to one object in the visual field when preparing a saccade to another, even when such a strategy would have been optimal (see also Henderson, 1996; Kowler et al., 1995; Sheperd et al., 1986) . Thus, in both the away and other object conditions of our experiments, visual attention had been directed away from the target object and to a different object in the visual field prior to the saccade that triggered the change. Participants' ability to detect such changes therefore provides evidence about whether visual object representations disintegrate upon the withdrawal of attention or whether visual object representations are preserved after the withdrawal of attention and accumulate during the extended visual exploration of a scene.
Change detection results. We have tested four change manipulations. First, the target object was deleted from the scene (Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999a; . Second, the target object was replaced with another object from a different basic-level category, a type change Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000b) . Third, the target object was replaced with another object from the same basiclevel category, a token change Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000b; . Fourth, the target object rotated 90° around its vertical axis (Henderson & Hollingworth, 1999a; Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000b) . In each of these cases, change detection performance for previously attended objects was significantly above the false alarm rate. Deletions were detected best (~75% correct), followed by type changes (~40% correct). Token changes and rotations were more difficult to detect but were still detected on a significant percentage of trials (~30% correct for each). These results are not consistent with the prediction of the localist-minimalist view, and that view has particular difficulty accounting for the detection of token changes and rotations. It is possible that a deletion or type change might alter the gist of the scene if a representation of gist is detailed enough to code the identities of individual objects. In addition, if participants retained abstract identity codes from previously recognized objects, such information could likewise support the detection of a change to the presence or basic-level identity of the target. Both possibilities would be broadly consistent with the localist-minimalist view. However, token changes and rotations should not alter the gist of the scene nor should such changes be detectable based on the retention of a basic-level identity code from the target. Instead, participants' ability to detect token changes and rotations suggests that on some trials, a visual representation of the target object was retained after attention had been withdrawn from that object, consistent with Visual Memory Theory. From a more empirical perspective, these results demonstrate that sustained visual attention to a changing object is not a necessary condition for the detection of that change, a result that is inconsistent with localist-minimalist theories (e.g., O'Regan et al, 2000; Rensink et al., 1997; Rensink, 2000a; Wolfe, 1999) .
In addition to the primary detection results, three other results from these studies provide converging evidence in support of Visual Memory Theory.
Delayed detection upon refixation. First, in the studies described above, object changes were often missed when they first occurred, only to be detected later during viewing when the target object happened to be refixated. In other words, the probability of detecting a change increased when the target object was refixated after it had changed. This phenomenon of delayed detection upon refixation suggests first that visual object representations were retained in memory over a relatively long period of time after attention was withdrawn, and second that refixation of the changed object served as a strong cue to retrieve and compare the stored visual object representation to current perceptual information. In addition, participants often fixated many intervening scene regions over the course of a number of seconds (approximately 5 s on average) between the target change and the first refixation of the (now changed) target. Given the strong capacity constraints on VSTM, it is likely that the retention of target object information occurred in long-term memory rather than in VSTM.
Semantic consistency effects. A second strand of converging evidence comes from a manipulation of the semantic consistency of the target object in the scene . In this study, participants viewed line drawings of scenes in which the target object was either semantically consistent with the scene (e.g., a microscope in a laboratory) or semantically inconsistent (e.g., a teddy bear in a laboratory). During a saccade away from the target, it was replaced by another token of the same basic-level category. Scene memory research has demonstrated that the memory representation of semantically inconsistent objects is more detailed and/or complete compared to semantically consistent objects (e.g., Friedman, 1979) . If visual object representations can accumulate in long-term memory during the online perceptual processing of a scene, then changes to semantically inconsistent objects should be detected more accurately than changes to consistent objects, which is precisely what we found. Note that localist-minimalist theories cannot account for this effect of semantic consistency on change detection, as that view predicts change detection for previously attended objects should be at floor regardless of semantic consistency.
Implicit effects of change on fixation duration. It is important to consider what can and cannot be concluded about visual representation from the results of explicit change detection experiments. The logic of change blindness experiments has been the following: If visual representations can be retained across disruptions such as a saccade, then mismatches between the retained representation and current input should be obvious and detectable. The problem with this logic is that it requires additional assumptions about the relationship between conscious experience and the underlying representations. In particular, it assumes that the experience of change directly reflects the nature of the representations generated during visual perception. This sort of assumption is deeply rooted in the traditional study of perception, where an explanation of perceptual experience is taken to be the prima facie goal of the scientific enterprise of vision science. Undermining this assumption of the transparency of mechanism through experience, though, is the fact that much of our perceptual machinery operates below the level of conscious awareness. For example, we are not aware that vision is suppressed during saccades. Indeed, most people are not aware that they are making saccadic eye movements at all. In our third, and perhaps most important line of evidence bearing on the nature of scene representation, we have observed that explicit change detection significantly underestimated the extent to which visual information is retained in memory from previously attended objects.
To look for implicit effects in our scene experiments, on trials in which a change occurred but was not explicitly detected (i.e., participants did not push the response button to indicate detection of a change), we examined gaze duration on that object for the first entry of the eyes into the object region after the change. Gaze duration is the sum of the durations of all fixations from the entry of the eyes into an object region to the exit of the eyes from that region. Gaze duration for the "miss" trials was compared to the equivalent entry in the condition when no change occurred. Across multiple studies, we have observed a large and robust elevation of gaze duration for miss trials compared to the no-change control trials Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000b; . For example, in Hollingworth et al., 2000, we found that when a token change was not explicitly detected, mean gaze duration on that object after the change was 749 ms. For the equivalent entry when no change occurred, mean gaze duration was 499 ms. In addition, implicit effects such as these were observed despite the fact that there were often many intervening fixations on other objects between the change and the first refixation of the target. In , participants made an average of 13.5 fixations between the (never detected) change and the next fixation on that object. Like the phenomenon of delayed explicit detection, the finding that gaze durations on changed targets increase following many intervening fixations suggests that visual object representations were retained in long-term memory after the withdrawal of attention and so were available to influence subsequent fixations on that object. It seems that despite our failure to consciously notice changes, detection is nevertheless taking place below the level of consciousness within the visual system. Thus, the failure to consciously detect a change does not provide evidence that the information needed to detect that change has not been stored. In general, large and robust implicit effects of change raise doubts about the validity of change detection as a measure of visual representation. Implicit effects of scene and object changes have also recently been reported by Hayhoe et al. (1998), Fernandez-Duque and Thornton (2000) , and Williams and Simons (2000) .
In summary, initial studies in the change blindness literature interpreted the frequent failure of participants to explicitly report a change in a visual display as evidence for the absence of relevant visual representation. Our experiments are part of a growing body of data demonstrating that when more indirect or implicit measures of visual representation are used, such as fixation duration, robust evidence of visual representation is obtained. It is interesting to note that this situation is not unprecedented within visual cognition. Early studies in what came to be known as the negative priming literature used an explicit report paradigm to investigate the visual representation of ignored stimuli (Rock & Gutman, 1981) . Finding little evidence of explicit memory, Rock and Gutman reasoned that ignored stimuli received little or no perceptual processing and produced no memory trace. Subsequent studies using more indirect and implicit measures, however, demonstrated substantial perceptual processing of (Tipper, 1985) and remarkably stable memory traces for (DeSchepper & Treisman, 1996) ignored stimuli. Thus, converging sources of evidence suggest that explicit report is not a reliable measure of visual representation.
Forced-Choice Discrimination Experiments
Given the potential interpretative difficulties of change detection studies, we have also conducted experiments in which we tested participants' memory for previously attended objects in a forcedchoice paradigm (Hollingworth & Henderson, 2000b) . Memory for a target object was tested during the online perceptual exploration of a scene (an online memory test) and after the scene had been removed for a number of minutes (a long-term memory test). In the former, participants viewed 3D-rendered, color scenes of common environments while their eye movements were monitored. After the initiation of each trial, the computer waited until the target object had been fixated at least once, assuring that it had been focally attended prior to the test. Then, during a saccade to another object on the other side of the scene, the target was obscured by a salient mask that extended just beyond the boundaries of the target. Because the appearance of the mask coincided with a saccade to a different object in the scene, the target object was not currently attended when the mask appeared. The appearance of the mask initiated a forced-choice memory test in which two object alternatives were displayed sequentially within the scene: the original target and a distractor object. The distractor was either a different token from the same basic-level category (token discrimination) or identical to the target object except rotated 90 degrees in depth around the vertical axis (orientation discrimination). Because the localist-minimalist view holds that coherent visual representations disintegrate as attention is withdrawn from an object, that view predicts that discrimination performance should be at chance for previously attended objects (50% correct). In contrast, the Visual Memory Theory predicts that discrimination should be significantly above chance because it posits that visual representations can be retained in memory after the withdrawal of attention. Consistent with the prediction of Visual Memory Theory, we found that both token and orientation discrimination were quite accurate (86.9% and 81.9% correct, respectively). In addition, on many trials, participants fixated multiple other objects in the scene between the last fixation on the target object prior to the onset of the mask and the initiation of the forced-choice test. Such longer-term retention would appear to be beyond the capabilities of VSTM, again suggesting that long-term memory played a significant role in the online construction of a scene representation.
To test long-term memory for objects in scenes directly, we also conducted a forced-choice discrimination test after the scene had been removed for a number of minutes (between 5 and 30 min). Similarly to the online test, for each studied scene, participants viewed two versions of that scene in the test session: one that was identical to the studied scene and a distractor scene that differed only in the target object. The distractor object was either a different type, different token, or the same object rotated in depth. This longer retention interval did not cause much of a decrement in discrimination performance compared to online discrimination. Mean type-discrimination performance was 93.1% correct, mean tokendiscrimination performance was 80.6% correct, and mean orientation-discrimination performance was 81.9% correct. The similarity between discrimination performance on the online and longterm tests suggests that visual object representations are stable after attention is removed, at least over the retention intervals we tested. Our long-term memory results are consistent with evidence from the picture memory literature suggesting good memory for the visual form of whole scenes (Standing et al., 1970) and for the visual form of individual objects within scenes (Friedman, 1979; Parker, 1978) .
These data, along with the change detection results reviewed above, provide unequivocal evidence that visual object representations accumulate in memory from previously attended objects, forming a relatively detailed scene representation. Contrary to proposals based on change blindness, abstract visual representations do not necessarily decay upon the withdrawal of attention.
Conclusion
We began this chapter by outlining six phenomena for theories of scene perception and representation. We have suggested that recent theorizing based on a localist-minimalist view of scene representation cannot adequately accommodate this array of phenomena. In contrast to localist-minimalist theories, we have proposed a Visual Memory Theory in which known memory processes are used to provide an integrated framework for accounting for these phenomena. The theory posits that visually rich scene representations, often unavailable to conscious report, are created based on the encoding and retention of abstracted visual properties in short-and long-term memory. The theory explicitly acknowledges the role of eye movements in the encoding and retrieval of scene representations, and places the explanation for failure to detect scene changes firmly on the shoulders of these established memory processes. Figure 1 . The top panel shows a typical scan pattern for a viewer attempting to commit a scene to memory. The dots in the scan pattern represent fixations, and the lines represent saccades. The contrast of the scene has been reduced in the figure to better show the scan pattern. The bottom panel shows a gray-scale version of a scene used in the experiments described in this chapter. In the experiments, the scenes were presented in full color. The bottom panel also shows two critical scene regions defined for the experiments. Region A surrounds the target object that changes in an experiment. In some experiments, entrance into or exit from Region A triggers a change to the target object. Region B surrounds an alternative change-triggering region: In some experiments, a display change to the target object in Region A is generated only when the eyes enter Region B. The region boundaries are software-defined and are invisible to the viewers in the experiments.
